Infinitism and Doxastic Justification

Nicolás Francisco Lo Guercio

Abstract


The article discusses infinitism, the view that a belief is justified for a subject only if she possesses an infinite chain of available reasons for that belief. In its most recent and sophisticated version, the view allegedly escapes the problems that trouble its main competitors, foundationalism and coherentism, while avoiding the traditional objections which relegated it to a marginal place. The article argues that despite these improvements, sophisticated versions of infinitism face a pressing problem, viz. they are unable to appropriately articulate propositional and doxastic justification.


Keywords


Epistemology; Justification; Infinite Regress; Basing Relation; Foundationism

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv.2018.11.1078

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