Sartre: A Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness

Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina

Abstract


The aim of this paper is to propose a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness from Sartre. For it I will clarify and show the closeness of two ideas. The first of these is the so-called self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way. The second of these are the descriptions of consciousness from Sartre, which say that all consciousness is self-consciousness of itself, or more precisely: every positional consciousness of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself. With the above, the phenomenal consciousness would be self-consciousness of itself and the self-consciousness of itself would be self-representation.


Keywords


Phenomenal Consciousness; Subjective Character, Self-representational Theory of Consciousness; Pre-reflective Consciousness, Self-intimation

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv.2018.11.850

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