THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN CHILE
FORMAL RIGIDITY AND SOCIAL FLUIDITY, OUR MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/pe.2023.15.4032Keywords:
social contract, formal institutions, informal institutions, reforms, welfareAbstract
In Chile, the social contract has been under enormous stress in recent years. In fact, we have been discussing the formal rules of the game in a democratic society for a decade. Naturally, this has had a significant impact on economic activity: lower growth of the economy, employment opportunities, tax collection and expansion of social rights. The aim of this article is to discuss this in the light of the social contract theory, a historical perspective and the analysis of some examples.
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