

## Dual-Process Theory and Metamorality in Greene: A Critical Reading from Latin America

*Teoría del proceso dual y metamoralidad en Greene: Una lectura crítica  
desde América Latina*

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### Resumen

Dos aspectos fundamentales de la propuesta filosófica desarrollada por Joshua Greene en su obra "Tribus morales" son el papel del control cognitivo en la teoría del proceso dual y su aplicación a la resolución de problemas morales a escala global, lo que él denomina metamoralidad. Basándose en su teoría, Greene propone una estrategia para abordar los conflictos morales tanto intragrupal como intergrupales. El propósito de este artículo es ofrecer un análisis crítico del papel que tiene el control cognitivo en la teoría del proceso dual, así como de la metamoralidad propuesta por Greene.

**Palabras clave:** Control cognitivo, tareas Stroop, juicio moral, dilemas morales, utilitarismo, deontología.

### Abstract

Two fundamental aspects of the philosophical proposal developed by Joshua Greene in his work 'Moral tribes' are the role of cognitive control in dual-process theory and its application to solving moral problems on a global scale, which he calls metamorality. Based on his theory, Greene proposes a strategy to address moral conflicts both intra and intergroup. The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the role of cognitive control in dual-process theory, as well as the metamorality proposed by Greene.

**Keywords:** Cognitive control, Stroop tasks, moral judgment, moral dilemmas, utilitarianism, deontology.



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## 1. Introducción

At the intersection of moral philosophy and neuroscience, Joshua Greene's work "Moral tribes" has become a prominent reference. In this book, Greene integrates dual-process theory with the notion of metamortality, offering a conceptual framework for addressing moral conflicts at both at individual and global levels. His work has inspired a field of study focused on understanding the evolutionary and neural foundations of moral decisions.

This paper critically analyzes two fundamental aspects of Greene's proposal: the role of cognitive control in dual-process theory and its application in resolving moral conflicts both intra and intergroup, particularly the applicability of his metamortality to the Latin American context.

It begins by explaining dual-process theory, which posits that two processing systems are involved in producing moral judgments: one emotional and automatic, and the other rational or controlling. The analogy Greene establishes between Stroop tasks and his dual-process theory, used to illustrate the role of cognitive control in moral judgment, is discussed. Contrary to Greene's thesis, it is argued that moral dilemmas do not involve confrontation between emotional and rational processes.

Furthermore, Greene's proposal for a global moral philosophy—metamortality—is explored, which suggests that through evolution, cognitive tools have been developed that allow communities to resolve intra and intergroup conflicts. The case of Latin America is brought up as a counterexample to this proposal, highlighting the social and humanitarian crises in various countries that contradict Greene's hypothesis about the resolution of intragroup and intergroup conflicts.

Overall, the paper offers a critical and reflective reading of Greene's dual-process theory and metamortality, questioning their applicability in specific contexts such as Latin America.

## 2. Discovering the path: Stroop tasks in the development of Greene's dual-process theory

The classical debate between Humeans and Kantians about whether morality stems from feelings or reason has evolved over the past century into a moral psychology debate about the underlying cause of moral judgment. In this debate, some argue that moral judgment results from emotions, while others contend that emotional processes do not play a part in this causal process. On the other hand, some argue that both emotional and rational processes play a role in moral judgment. Joshua Greene, a neuroscientist, and philosopher who

integrates knowledge from cognitive science, moral philosophy, and evolutionary psychology, falls into this latter group.

According to his dual-process theory, moral judgments result from two processing systems: an emotional system, which is automatic, and another rational or controlling system. Depending on the situation being evaluated, these two processes may come into conflict. Greene argues that when conflict is low, automatic processes generally determine moral judgment, whereas in cases of high conflict, rational processes take precedence. He associates these processes, respectively, with deontological or utilitarian moral judgments. Broadly speaking, if moral judgment is driven by emotions, it tends to be deontological; if rational processes are involved, it is more likely to be utilitarian.

To account for the cognitive processes involved in cases of low and high conflict, Greene, with the help of Cohen (Greene, 2013, 119), employs Stroop tasks to illustrate the type of cognitive processing that occurs when an individual evaluates a moral conflict.

The Stroop task is a psychological experiment introduced by John Ridley Stroop in 1935, which has allowed advancements in research related to cognitive processes involved in attention, interference, and cognitive processing. Stroop's original experiment aimed to investigate interference in reaction time (RT) in naming the color of printed words. In his seminal work, "Studies of Interference in Serial Verbal Reactions," Stroop (1935/1992) presented participants with a list of color names (e.g., red, blue, green) printed in incongruent ink colors (e.g., the word "red" written in blue ink). Participants had to name the ink color while inhibiting the automatic response of reading the word. Stroop found that participants experienced interference, and incongruent pairs of color and word resulted in slower reaction times.

Thus, in Stroop tasks, individuals are presented with three types of stimuli. A congruent stimulus in which the ink color matches the written word (e.g., the word "red" written in red ink). An incongruent stimulus in which the ink color conflicts with the written word (e.g., the word "red" written in blue ink), and a neutral stimulus consisting of several X's in which the individual must indicate the color of the ink in which the X's are written. Participants must respond as quickly as possible to the ink color and ignore the written word. The effect of semantic interference is calculated by comparing reaction times between congruent and incongruent stimuli. For an exhaustive review of the topic, see MacLeod (1991).

Functional neuroimaging studies show that, in the case of incongruent stimuli, brain areas related to cognitive control are involved, allowing the person to respond correctly to the task (Hatukai & Algom, 2017). Thus, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) functions as a conflict monitor, detecting simultaneous activation of incompatible responses in the brain. For example, when the word 'red' is presented in blue color, one group of neurons activates to

indicate 'red,' while another group activates to indicate 'blue.' The ACC detects this discrepancy and sends a signal to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to resolve the conflict according to the task indicated (Greene, 2013, 295). In other words, the ACC identifies the presence of cognitive conflict, and the DLPFC is responsible for controlling and regulating the appropriate response based on task demands.

As Greene tells us, Stroop tasks allowed him to illustrate the role of cognitive control in moral judgment, based on which he developed his dual-process theory (Greene, 2013, 120; 2004; 2001). In general terms, dual-process theory posits that cognitive processes are handled by two distinct mechanisms, one fast, automatic, and unconscious, and the other slow, controlled, and conscious, which operate independently and compete for behavioral control. Daniel Kahneman related the fast and unconscious process to intuitions, and the slow and conscious process to reasoning (Brand, 2016, 12). From here, dual-process theories were introduced in moral psychology and are now frequently used to describe human moral behavior. However, the idea that there are fast, automatic, and unconscious thought processes that combine and compete with slow, deliberative, and conscious processes can be traced back to Plato (J. Evans & Frankish, 2009), through William James (1890, p. 451), Freud (Brakel & Shevrin, 2003; J. St. B. T. Evans, 2008), Kahneman (Kahneman, 2011), among others. For a historical and general review of different approaches to dual-process theories, see Evans & Frankish (2009).

The Stroop tasks require cognitive control, involving the DLPFC and the ACC, to override automatic reading processes, allowing the subject to respond according to the task instructed: naming the color of the ink. In Greene's dual-process theory, it is postulated that the ACC detects the conflict generated by the moral dilemma, and the DLPFC intervenes to resolve it by inhibiting automatic impulses, operating similarly to how it does in Stroop tasks. Thus, in cases of moral evaluation, a conflict arises between emotional processes (deontology) and deliberative processes (utilitarianism), with cognitive control being the mechanism that resolves this conflict.

### **3. Emotions and deliberation in moral dilemmas: the role of deontology and utilitarianism in moral judgments**

To illustrate his dual-process theory, Greene relies on dilemmas proposed by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1985), originally presented by Philippa Foot (1967), in which the experimental subject must decide whether to sacrifice one life to save five. Among the dilemmas most studied by Greene are those of the trolley, where participants - as explained by Kamm (2015, 58) - face the problem of determining when it is permissible to sacrifice one innocent and non-threatening person to save five, and when it is permissible to let five people die while

being able to kill one to save them. One of the most analyzed cases in the literature is the so-called bridge dilemma:

A runaway trolley is headed for five railway workmen who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. You are standing on a footbridge spanning the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. Next to you is a railway workman wearing a large backpack. The only way to save the five people is to push this man off the footbridge and onto the tracks below. The man will die as a result, but his body and backpack will stop the trolley from reaching the others. (You can't jump yourself because you, without a backpack, are not big enough to stop the trolley, and there's no time to put one on.) Is it morally acceptable to save the five people by pushing this stranger to his death? (Greene, 2013, 113)

In this case, most people assert that it is wrong to push the person off the bridge. An alternative version of the bridge dilemma is the so-called switch dilemma. In this scenario, a runaway trolley is headed for five workers who will die if nothing is done. You can save these five people by pressing a switch that will divert the trolley onto a sidetrack. Unfortunately, on the sidetrack, there is a worker who will die if you press the switch. Most people agree that it is acceptable to press the switch to save the five people.

The bridge dilemma exemplifies what Greene calls personal moral dilemmas (PMD), in which an agent causes direct physical harm to a person. In these types of dilemmas, the responses of experimental subjects mostly align with deontological norms that prohibit the sacrifice of innocents regardless of the consequences. The switch dilemma, on the other hand, exemplifies impersonal moral dilemmas (IMD), in which the agent causes collateral harm to another person. In this case, the response of experimental subjects mostly aligns with the utilitarian normative system, which aims for outcomes that benefit the greatest number of people.

One of Greene's findings is that the emotional areas of the brain are more activated when a person faces PMDs than IMDs. These results allow Greene to assert that emotions are important, perhaps constitutive, of deontological moral judgment (Greene, 2008; Rosas, 2014).

Another relevant finding is that when the experimental subject responds in a utilitarian manner, the RT increases more in PMDs (bridge dilemma) than in IMDs (switch dilemma). This is due to the conflict between emotional and deliberative mechanisms. In resolving this conflict, the DLPFC and ACC are activated. Analogous to Stroop tasks, the increase in activity in the DLPFC and ACC correlates with high RT. These results allow Greene to defend

a thesis according to which slow, conscious, and deliberative processes are important, perhaps constitutive, of utilitarian moral judgment (Greene, 2008; Rosas, 2014). Accordingly, Greene (2008, 37) proposes that the terms “deontology” and “consequentialism” correspond to psychological natural kinds.

#### 4. Moral dilemmas and dual-process: Deontology and utilitarianism as natural classes in Greene's theory

However, within the framework of the metaethical debate on the causal role of emotion in moral judgment production, Greene's studies did not fully resolve the "correlation is not causation problem", as they left open the possibility that emotions may be effects rather than constitutive elements or causes of such judgments (Greene, 2013, 125; Rosas, 2014;). Other researchers (Ciaramelli *et al.*, 2007; Koenigs *et al.*, 2007) applied Greene's methodology to patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) to address this problem, showing that the lack of relevant emotional capacities characteristic in these patients led to non-deontological responses, allowing to conclude that emotion is constitutive of deontological moral judgment (Rosas *et al.*, 2014). For a critical analysis of the studies conducted by Koenigs and Ciaramelli, refer to the work of Tovar and Ostrosky (2013, 67-73).

In their research, Koenigs *et al.* (2007) and Ciaramelli *et al.* (2007) not only applied Greene's methodology but also supported his dual-process theory, which posits that deontology and utilitarianism are natural psychological kinds rather than merely philosophical concepts (Greene, 2008). Following Rosas *et al.* (2014, p. 95), this paper will use the term "module" to refer to these psychological natural kinds, a usage that aligns with Greene's dual-process theory (see Greene, 2013, p. 224).

Rosas *et al.* (2014) consider that the hypothesis of two brain modules with distinct moral functions, one deontological and the other utilitarian, is creative but not supported by plausible evolutionary evidence. Both utilitarianism and deontology are philosophical proposals, products of highly sophisticated reflections, that attempt to explain the cognitive and emotional processes underlying our moral attitudes, and as such, they are not good candidates to be considered as innate structures fixed by evolution. With this, Rosas *et al.* (2014) would also refute Greene's thesis that the deontological module would be ancestral, and the utilitarian one would be recent (2008, 70-72). In this sense, from the perspective of explanatory metaethics, the validity of the evolutionary hypothesis that underpins the dual theory proposed by Greene is at least debatable.

## 5. Cognitive control in moral dilemmas: Critique of the analogy between stroop tasks and dual-process theory

Assuming the existence of two brain modules with different moral functions—one for utilitarian morality and the other for deontological morality—raises a problem that directly challenges Greene's dual-process theory. As previously mentioned, Greene draws an analogy between the cognitive processes involved in Stroop tasks and those underlying in moral judgment. According to his dual-process theory, cognitive control mediates the conflict between emotional and rational processes, functioning in a manner analogous to its role in Stroop tasks.

Greene argues that in moral dilemmas, emotional and deliberative processes are represented by the deontological and utilitarian modules, respectively. This confrontation is evidenced by the activation of areas such as the amygdala, the vmPFC, the DLPFC, and the ACC. However, upon examining this analogy, it becomes evident that cognitive control does not directly conflict with emotional processes but rather acts as a mechanism to resolve the conflict between different emotional responses in moral dilemmas. On the involvement of the DLPFC and ACC in emotional processes, see Etkin *et al.* (2011) and Nejati *et al.* (2021). An analysis of the dual-process proposed by Greene in his theory will follow.

Consider the scenario proposed by Greene, in which a person faces the dilemma of deciding whether to allow a trolley to run over five people or intervene, thereby participating in the death of one innocent person. In this situation, the person is likely to experience conflicting emotional responses, as emotions drive them both to save lives and to avoid causing harm to others. Two types of opposing emotions are triggered in such dilemmas. On one hand, there are emotions linked to the moral norm prohibiting harm to an innocent person, as when one presses the switch knowing that it will cause someone's death or pushes someone off a bridge. On the other hand, emotions are triggered by the perceived obligation to act to prevent harm, particularly when one has the opportunity to save five people from being run over by the trolley.

While Greene does not emphasize this aspect, witnessing a trolley about to run over five people will, *ceteris paribus*, elicit emotional responses in the experimental subject due to the violation of a moral norm—unless, for example, the subject is a psychopath, a neuronal sociopath, or a cultural sociopath (Damasio, 2000; Young *et al.*, 2012; Tovar & Ostrosky, 2013, 77). The emotional burden caused by the anticipated tragedy is intensified by the consideration of intervening to save the five people. Furthermore, the prospect of participating in the death of an innocent person, either by pressing a switch or, worse yet, by pushing someone off a bridge, greatly intensifies the emotional conflict.



In Stroop tasks, where the experimental subject faces the conflict between the written word and the color of the ink, cognitive control allows them to choose an appropriate response. In this case, there is no conflict between cognitive control—characterized by generating a slow, conscious, and deliberative process—and the color of the ink. Similarly, in moral dilemmas, cognitive control allows the person to resolve the emotional conflict and make a decision. In this sense, cognitive control intervenes to resolve the emotional conflict generated by, on one hand, foreseeing the tragedy of five people being run over by a trolley and, on the other hand, the emotional response related to the possibility of saving those five people while participating in the death of an innocent person.

It is important to note that—unlike in Stroop tasks, where the task is clear and precise, allowing the experimental subject to give a defined response (naming the color of the ink)—in the cases posed by Greene, the subject is presented with two options without indicating which is the correct answer. It is possible that in moral dilemmas, there is no correct answer, as they force the experimental subject to transgress at least one moral norm, regardless of the decision made.

The interpretation proposed suggests that the emotional conflict presented in moral dilemmas is detected by the ACC, which sends a signal to the DLPFC, thereby activating control and deliberation mechanisms. These control processes contribute to resolving the conflict by inhibiting one of the emotional responses, allowing the individual to make a decision regarding the moral dilemma.

In summary, moral dilemmas generate competing emotional processes in the experimental subject, rather than a direct confrontation between emotional and rational processes. This conflict is resolved through cognitive control, involving the ACC and DLPFC. Questioning the analogy that Greene establishes with Stroop tasks encourages us to reconsider our understanding of the role of cognitive control in moral judgment and its broader implications for dual-process theory.

In the next section, we will revisit the topic of the two *psychological natural kinds*, or moral modules, proposed by Greene, this time in the context of his metamorality, i.e., his proposal for a global moral philosophy.

## 6. Challenges of Greene's metamorality: An analysis from the Latin American reality

Greene (2013) extends his reflection on the evolution of the two moral modules, the deontological and the utilitarian, to a second level, that of metamorality. He argues that the deontological module allows individuals to resolve conflicts within the group, while the utilitarian module enables them to resolve those that arise between groups.



Greene's proposal suggests that our moral intuitions, shaped by biological and cultural evolution, play a valuable role in our personal lives and intragroup situations, facilitating cooperation and group cohesion. However, he warns that in moral conflicts between "Us versus Them," it is necessary to activate rational thought or "manual mode," to use his metaphor with the camera (Greene, 2013, 133). This slow, deliberative process enables individuals to overcome prejudices and emotional biases inherent in moral intuitions when interacting with different social groups, fostering more objective decision-making in intergroup contexts.

Given that Greene argues emotions and deontological reasoning are closely linked, rational thought—characterized by slow, conscious, and deliberative processes—becomes the cognitive tool that enables individuals to resolve intergroup conflicts by overcoming emotionally driven biases that hinder cooperation. In this sense, while moral intuitions evolved to facilitate cooperation within groups, Greene contends that rational thought is essential for resolving moral conflicts between different communities and moral tribes.

From this perspective, conflicts that arise within a group tend to be resolved more easily than those occurring between groups. This is because our moral intuitions evolved primarily to encourage cooperation among members of a cohesive 'Us,' where shared values, norms, and goals create a foundation for mutual understanding. In such intragroup contexts, moral intuitions are generally aligned and function effectively to promote cooperation and manage conflicts—although they are not infallible and may still generate tensions when individual interests diverge.

On the other hand, Greene argues that relationships between groups ("Us versus Them") are more likely to generate conflicts due to the inherent biases in our moral intuitions. These biases can foster partiality towards one's own group while promoting distrust, discrimination, or even antagonism toward outsiders. In intergroup contexts, moral intuitions often fail to resolve conflicts effectively, as they tend to favor the interests of one's group over others. Consequently, Greene contends that rational deliberation, rather than intuitive moral responses, is necessary for achieving cooperation and resolving moral disputes between groups.

For this reason, Greene suggests that adopting a framework grounded in utilitarian principles—one that prioritizes the welfare of all groups involved—may be more relevant and effective for addressing moral conflicts between groups. This approach aims to override the inherent biases of our moral intuitions and promote more inclusive and impartial cooperation among diverse communities.

In short, Greene views morality as a set of psychological adaptations that evolved to promote cooperation within groups, helping to manage the Tragedy of the Commons (Me vs

Us). However, he identifies a new moral challenge: the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality (Us vs Them), where conflicting moral values emerge between different groups. Since our moral intuitions evolved primarily for intragroup cooperation, they offer no inherent mechanism for resolving intergroup moral conflicts.

Applied to nations, the “Us vs Them” dynamic manifests in intergroup conflicts, as each country operates according to its own set of values, cultural norms, and moral beliefs. These differing moral frameworks often hinder cooperation on global challenges such as human rights, environmental policies, and economic systems—illustrating Greene’s concept of the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality.

To address this issue, Greene proposes a utilitarian metamorality known as ‘deep pragmatism.’ Rather than merely emphasizing shared values, deep pragmatism seeks to resolve moral conflicts by establishing a common moral framework that extends beyond individual and tribal moral intuitions. This framework aims to facilitate cooperation not only within groups but also between large-scale entities such as nations, which often hold incompatible moral worldviews. By prioritizing consequentialist reasoning over parochial moral intuitions, deep pragmatism aspires to mitigate intergroup tensions. For a critical discussion of deep pragmatism, including its conceptual complexities, see Kraaijeveld and Sauer (2019)

In what follows, I will examine how Greene’s metamorality applies to the Latin American context.

In the Latin American context, citizens of each country perceive themselves as part of an intragroup ‘Us,’ united by shared cultural, historical, and social bonds that cultivate a strong sense of national identity. This intragroup belonging serves as a foundation for cooperation and mutual support within each nation. However, at the intergroup level, individual countries relate to one another as ‘Them.’ According to Greene’s framework, while moral intuitions promote solidarity and coordination within groups, they also reinforce biases that hinder cooperation between groups.

On the other hand, relationships between different Latin American countries reflect the “between groups” dynamic. Each country has its own interests, policies, and priorities, leading to tensions and conflicts in interactions. According to Greene’s theory, moral intuitions are better suited for resolving conflicts within groups (‘Us’) but struggle to manage disputes between groups (‘Them’). As a result, intergroup conflicts are expected to be more persistent and difficult to resolve than intragroup conflicts.

However, Latin America presents a case that complicates this hypothesis. Countries like Mexico, Haiti, El Salvador, and Colombia face severe internal crises—widespread violence from drug cartels, gang warfare, political instability, and protracted armed conflicts—that

have led to grave humanitarian and social consequences. Mexico, for example, experiences higher levels of violence due to organized crime than many war-torn nations, while El Salvador has the highest incarceration rate in Latin America (Institute for Crime & Justice Policy Research, 2023), reflecting a crisis of internal security. Haiti's political fragmentation and resource scarcity have led to repeated humanitarian disasters, and Colombia continues to grapple with deep-rooted political and social divisions stemming from its decades-long armed conflict.

Contrary to Greene's hypothesis, none of these countries is currently at war with its neighbors. Instead, the death toll from internal violence ('Us vs. Us') far exceeds that of intergroup conflicts ('Us vs. Them'). This challenges Greene's hypothesis that intragroup cooperation naturally prevails over intergroup conflict—at least in the case of Latin America

Latin America presents a challenge for Greene's deep pragmatism: not only do moral intuitions fail to scale to intergroup cooperation, but they may also falter in large, divided societies where competing tribes exist within the same national borders. In these nations, the Me vs Us may not be as cohesive as expected. Instead of a unified national identity that promotes cooperation, internal divisions based on ideology, class or criminal networks can function as rival moral tribes within the same country. If moral identity fractures at the national level, the distinction between Me vs Us and Us vs Them' collapses, leading to high levels of internal violence. Thus, Latin America might represent a case in which moral tribalism operates at a more fragmented level, weakening intragroup unity and fuelling internal conflict—while, in contrast to Greene's hypothesis, managing to maintain intergroup stability.

## 7. Conclusion

The impact of Joshua Greene's dual-process theory on moral psychology has been significant, though it has faced various criticisms in recent years (Demaree-Cotton & Kahane, 2018; Gürçay & Baron, 2017; Kahane, 2012; Klein, 2011; Rosas *et al.*, 2019; Sauer, 2012; Gawronski *et al.*, 2017; Bago & De Neys, 2019). According to Malle (2021), these criticisms are substantial; however, most scholars agree that moral judgment involves a cognitive trade-off between deontological and utilitarian reasoning.

In this paper, we have examined Greene's proposed analogy between Stroop tasks and moral judgment, highlighting that cognitive control does not necessarily come into direct conflict with emotional processes but functions as a regulatory mechanism between competing emotions in moral dilemmas. This critique questions the thesis that, according to Malle (2021), remains intact in Greene's proposal.

On the other hand, Greene's metamorality—which advocates a utilitarian approach to resolving intergroup conflicts—has been evaluated in light of the Latin American reality. His theory posits that intragroup relationships naturally promote greater cooperation and conflict resolution than intergroup ones. However, Latin America presents a different pattern: severe internal crises persist, while armed conflicts between neighboring countries remain relatively rare.

This reality raises questions about the applicability of Greene's metamorality in contexts where intragroup conflicts predominate over intergroup ones. If moral intuitions evolved to promote cooperation within groups, why do we observe such deep fragmentation within the region? Instead of a cohesive Us encouraging solidarity, many Latin American countries experience internal moral tribalism, where ideological, class, and criminal factions compete within the same borders. As a result, the distinction between Us and Them collapses, fueling widespread internal violence.

While Greene's framework aims to overcome emotional biases and promote cooperation, the complexity of intragroup conflicts in Latin America suggests that his approach requires adaptation to contexts where the Me vs Us and Us vs Them dynamics operate differently from the one proposed in his theory. This discrepancy underscores the need for ethical theories to be context-sensitive, acknowledging that universal moral solutions may not be suitable for societies that do not readily align with a metamoral theory like the one proposed in Moral Tribes.

Ultimately, achieving effective moral solutions from a metamoral perspective requires interdisciplinary dialogue and a deep understanding of the social, cultural, and political complexities that shape moral judgments. While Greene's metamorality represents a step forward in developing a global ethical framework, this paper highlights the necessity of adapting metamorality to diverse sociopolitical contexts. Addressing moral problems effectively demands a context-sensitive approach that accounts for local realities, rather than assuming a one-size-fits-all moral framework.

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