Introduction

Joshua Greene*

*Harvard University
jgreene@wjh.harvard.edu

It is an enormous honor to introduce this *dossier* of the *Humanities Journal of Valparaíso*. While much of my work has focused on dilemmas in which there is a conflict between emotion and reason —between the proverbial "heart" and "head"— here there is no such tension, as I am delighted by the intellectual feast that the authors have generously provided. Looking over the contents of this *dossier* brings to mind some positive developments that have occurred over the last twenty-five years.

First, there has been a much greater integration between philosophy and experimental psychology and neuroscience. In the 90s and previously, one would occasionally see references to such scientific research by philosophers, but never see original scientific results presented in a philosophy journal. Flores Ascencio and Pallarés-Domínguez continue this trend with intriguing research on the role of metacognition in moral judgment. Likewise, I am heartened to see Tovar's article delving into the role of cognitive control in dual-process moral judgment.

Second, there has been greater attention to cultural variation and the ways in which this can challenge philosophical and empirical assumptions. This is exemplified by Zavadiker's article, which raises a general challenge for the utilitarian tradition: Can there be a unitary notion of happiness sufficient to provide a global "common currency"? Perhaps it's possible to distinguish between what one might call a "concept" of happiness and a "conception" of happiness, much as Rawls distinguished between a concept and a conception of justice. Consistent with Zavadiker's conclusion, it seems likely that there is no unifying conception of happiness across cultures. But perhaps utilitarians —or deep pragmatists, as I prefer— can articulate a more abstract concept of happiness with room enough to accommodate the full range of cultural variation, while remaining sufficiently substantive to support decisions involving tradeoffs.

I am appreciative of Castro Nogueira, Castro, and Toro Ibañez's supportive work-having many critics, I do not take this for granted. And I very much appreciated the insights in

Daguerre's editorial introduction. This illuminating article shows me how I might have presented more precisely my ideas about the relationships among emotion, reasoning, and the values foisted upon us by evolution. In particular, I appreciate Daguerre's close reading across disparate attempts to formulate these ideas, and I think we both agree that the most precise way to convey what is most defensible in these attempts is in terms of distinct computational learning principles and their relative strengths and weaknesses.

I am very grateful for the great effort and insight that has gone into the volume. It is a great pleasure to be part of this engaging international, intercultural, and interdicplinary conversation.

With much appreciation and admiration,

Joshua D. Greene