TY - JOUR
AU - Rubin, Mariela
PY - 2017/07/23
Y2 - 2022/01/18
TI - Logical Constants and Harmony of the Rules of Inference
JF - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso
JA - RHV
VL - 0
IS - 9
SE - Articles
DO - 10.22370/rhv.2017.9.852
UR - https://revistas.uv.cl/index.php/RHV/article/view/64
SP - 103-119
AB - <p>All through the literatura, the question about what is a logical constant has recieved many answers, from model-theoretic aproaches (Tarski; 1966), (Sher; 1991), (Bonnay; 2007) to answers that focus in the inferential practice as meaning (Dummett; 1991), (Prawitz; 1965), (Lorenzen; 1955). Detractors of the second tradition presented many ineludible incovenients, in particular, the logical constant named ‘tonk’ (Prior; 1960). Inferentialist tryed many solutions, in particular they presented the concept of ‘harmony’. The goal of this paper is to show that the different criteria of ‘harmony’ used in the proof-theoretic semantics to determine what is and what is not a logical constant fail to be necessary or sufficient. I will show the philosophical reasons that make this concept appear and then i will describe the different ways in wich the literatura understads the concept of ‘harmony’. Then I will show that they subgenerate or overgenerate connectives with some counterexamples. Finaly, I will explain some philosophical reasons that should delimitate where to go towards a satisfactory definition of ‘harmony’.</p>
ER -