On the legitimacy of the meta-philosophical interrogation in philosophy of biology


  • E. Joaquín Suárez-Ruíz Universidad Nacional de La Plata




philosophy of biology, philosophical naturalism, meta-philosophy, anthropocentrism


One of the most controversial and currently developed lines of research in philosophy of biology is that in which philosophers investigate pre-Darwinian assumptions that would still be present at the base of other philosophical sub-disciplines, such as ethics, epistemology, philosophy of language, etc. This type of inquiry, which I will call here “meta-philosophical interrogation,” can be thought as a complementary approach to the epistemological one, which allows us to broaden the critical approach of the discipline in question. The objective of this article will be to analyze the characteristics of the “meta-philosophical interrogation” and to argue about its legitimacy as a way of inquiry proper to the philosophy of biology.


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How to Cite

Suárez-Ruíz, E. J. (2019). On the legitimacy of the meta-philosophical interrogation in philosophy of biology. RHV. An International Journal of Philosophy, (14), 377–393. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2019iss14pp377-393