Duhem’s Thesis, Feyerabend’s Methodological Anarchism and the Question About the Justification of Epistemic Change

Authors

  • Edgar Serna Ramírez Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2021iss18pp173-192

Keywords:

objectivity, arbitrariness, rationality, criticism, persuasion, theory choice

Abstract

Duhem-Quine’s thesis provides plausibility for Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism by showing that the empirical refutation of a theoretical system is as chimerical as its verification. Grünbaum argues against this that such a thesis is untenable. They both agree in the formulation of Duhem’s argument as it was exposed by Quine. However, the exegesis carried out by Quinn, Laudan and Ariew makes it clear that it is a mistake to identify the Duhem-Quine thesis with the Duhem thesis. I argue that, if this is so, then a refutation that can be accepted as such only in retrospect is logically possible.

References

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Published

2022-02-02 — Updated on 2022-04-11

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How to Cite

Serna Ramírez, E. (2022). Duhem’s Thesis, Feyerabend’s Methodological Anarchism and the Question About the Justification of Epistemic Change. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (18), 173–192. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2021iss18pp173-192 (Original work published February 2, 2022)

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