On the Ontological Status of Propositional Attitudes


  • Simón Busch Moreno




Propositional attitudes, language, epistemological models, abstractions, physicalism, eliminativism


The main conclusion of this article is that propositional attitudes are physical brain processes that pertain to language. Hence, propositional attitudes cannot be direct manifestations of our mental states, neither direct representations; instead they must be understood as second-order representations. Thus, propositional attitudes cannot serve for explaining our basic mental activity. Otherwise, propositional attitudes must be understood as language shortcuts used for referring to basic mental states, events or processes.


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How to Cite

Busch Moreno, S. (2016). On the Ontological Status of Propositional Attitudes. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (6), 109–124. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv.2015.6.402