Androcentrism, science and philosophy of science

Federico Nahuel Bernabé

Abstract


In this work we will take up again the contributions of the feminist philosophy of science around androcentrism, with special emphasis on biology and biomedical sciences. We will propose that such contributions can be ordered according to three different senses of androcentrism, and that important tensions appear between these senses. Following the path traced by Longino, contextual critical empiricism, we will defend that the rational reconstruction of theories can help us to specify where patriarchal decision vectors crouch in scientific practice. To this end, we will present an alternative analysis to Longino’s and use it as an input to discuss the idea of type brains in the framework of the neuroendocrinology of behaviour.


Keywords


androcentrism; biology; feminism; structuralist view of theories; philosophy

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2019iss14pp287-313

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