Mirror Neurons. A Case Study of the Neuroscience-Philosophy Relationship

Authors

  • Diana I. Pérez Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas- SADAF-CONICET, Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss20pp29-45

Keywords:

second person, other minds, social cognition, action

Abstract

The discovery of the mirror neuron system, which occurred 25 years ago, was considered by some authors as a definitive proof of the superiority of one philosophical theory (the Simulation Theory) over another (the Theory of Theory). However, the claim to have found a definitive answer to the philosophical problem of understanding other minds from neuroscientific data is far from acceptable. In this work I will show that there is a multiplicity of possible interpretations regarding the role of mirror neurons, and that one of the most plausible seems consistent with the second-person perspective (Pérez and Gomila 2021). The conclusion I seek to draw from this case study is that there are no direct paths from neuroscience to the solution of (at least some) philosophical problems.

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Published

2022-12-01 — Updated on 2022-12-02

How to Cite

Pérez, D. I. (2022). Mirror Neurons. A Case Study of the Neuroscience-Philosophy Relationship. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (20), 29–45. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss20pp29-45

Issue

No. 20 (2022): No 20 (2022)

Section

Monographic Section

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