Las neuronas espejo. Un caso de estudio de la relación neurociencia-filosofía

Diana I. Pérez

doi:10.22370/rhv2022iss20pp29-45

Authors

Diana I. Pérez Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas- SADAF-CONICET, Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss20pp29-45

Keywords:

second person, other minds, social cognition, action

Abstract

The discovery of the mirror neuron system, which occurred 25 years ago, was considered by some authors as a definitive proof of the superiority of one philosophical theory (the Simulation Theory) over another (the Theory of Theory). However, the claim to have found a definitive answer to the philosophical problem of understanding other minds from neuroscientific data is far from acceptable. In this work I will show that there is a multiplicity of possible interpretations regarding the role of mirror neurons, and that one of the most plausible seems consistent with the second-person perspective (Pérez and Gomila 2021). The conclusion I seek to draw from this case study is that there are no direct paths from neuroscience to the solution of (at least some) philosophical problems.

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