Vocabulario de intuiciones y marcadores del razonamiento: un estudio de corpus desde la filosofía del lenguaje
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https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss24pp45-71Palabras clave:
filosofía experimental, métodos de corpus, vocabulario de intuiciones, marcadores de razonamientoResumen
Cappelen (2012) argumenta en contra de la Tesis de la Centralidad, es decir, en contra de la idea de que los filósofos analíticos usan las intuiciones como evidencia para defender sus teorías. Para ello, ataca el denominado “Argumento del vocabulario de intuiciones”, es decir, la idea de que las intuiciones deben jugar un papel determinante en los argumentos de los filósofos analíticos porque estos usan vocabulario de intuiciones de manera profusa. Este artículo examina empíricamente esta afirmación, determinando en qué medida el vocabulario de intuiciones aparece en partes centrales de los argumentos; más concretamente, si el vocabulario de intuiciones suele coincidir con marcadores de razonamiento que indican la presencia de premisas y conclusiones. Para ello, primero compilaré un corpus de artículos sobre desacuerdos de gusto. Segundo, llevaré a cabo dos tipos de análisis: un análisis de listas de frecuencias, y un análisis de la dispersión de ambos tipos de vocabulario a lo largo del corpus.
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