Towards a hybrid conception of the tolerance principle

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2026iss30.4732

Keywords:

vagueness, Sorites paradox, Tolerance, Paracomplete logic, Epistemicism

Abstract

This paper addresses the principle of tolerance, the central premise of the sorites paradox, which states that if two objects differ marginally with respect to a property P, then the corresponding vague predicate for P should apply to both or to neither. While semantic theories explain vagueness as a deficiency at the level of meaning and propose a many-valued logic to solve the sorites paradox, epistemic theories attribute this phenomenon to human limitations and get to keep classical logic, explaining the paradox away. This paper proposes a hybrid reading of the principle of tolerance, combining both approaches in order to overcome the limitations that each of them have (individually) and to provide an alternative yet more comprehensive conception of vagueness.

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References

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Published

2026-08-14

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How to Cite

Towards a hybrid conception of the tolerance principle. (2026). Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, 30, 92-108. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2026iss30.4732