Intentional Action and Know-How: reflections from Elizabeth Anscombe's Theory
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2026iss30.4760Keywords:
Practical knowledge, Minimal agency, Minimal self, I do, Rational attitudesAbstract
Since Ryle published The Concept of Mind (1949), the debate about know-how has gained significant relevance, especially in the context of the philosophy of action. Given that it is defined as a kind of knowledge closely linked to action, it is natural to find theses that connect it with agency and intentional action. The central question is: what is the relationship between these phenomena? In this article, we will address this question and argue that know-how should be considered a case of intentional action; however, it should not be reduced to it.
We will begin by presenting the ideas of Elizabeth Anscombe, highlighting her notion of practical knowledge as key to analyzing the connection with know-how. We will then propose a notion of minimal agency that accompanies all intentional actions. To do this, we will rely on Gallagher's (2000) "minimal self" and McDowell's (1994, 2007) "I do", which will be interpreted here in terms of rational attitudes. This perspective enriches Anscombe's notion of agency and allows us to distinguish intentional actions from fortuitous behaviors.
The second part examines attempts to connect intentional action with know-how. We will argue that characterizing know-how as intentional action is accurate, as it emphasizes its agential nature and differentiates it from non-epistemic behaviors. However, we will caution that reducing know-how to intentional action risks overlooking its peculiar characteristics. Therefore, we contend that it is essential to explore specific aspects of its nature that go beyond the generic instances of intentional action.
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