Know-how: expert testimony, quasi-testimony and deepfakes
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2026iss30.5679Keywords:
know-how, testimony, expert, IAG, deepfakesAbstract
Recently, contemporary epistemology has focused on deepfakes as an emerging problem. However, the know-how concerning the distinction between expert’s testimony and the outputs produced by a generative artificial intelligence has not been addressed in detail. This paper accounts for that kind of knowledge by pointing out that it consists in being able to show in practice that one distinguishes between virtualized experts and digital pseudo-experts. To account for this, the first section discusses the difference between genuine expert testimony and the quasi-testimonies produced by GAI and manifested in deepfake. The second section distinguishes between the virtualized expert and the pseudo-digital expert, pointing out that the problem lies in assuming an equivalence between the two of them. Finally, it is pointed out that know-how to distinguish between the two, presupposes a digital sensibility that demonstrates one's ability to take actions that effectively distinguish a deepfake from a real expert. Through this analysis, we aim to contribute to the discussion on the know-how related to deepfakes.
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