Under- and Overspecification in Moral Foundation Theory. The Problematic Search for a Moderate Version of Innatism

Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich

doi:10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp163-179

Autores/as

Rodrigo Sebastián Braicovich Universidad Nacional de Rosario / CONICET

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss19pp163-179

Palabras clave:

naturaleza humana, evolución, intuicionismo social, filosofía de la mente, intuición, filosofía política

Resumen

La Teoría de los Fundamentos Morales de Jonathan Haidt ha sido blanco de numerosas críticas, fundamentalmente en función de la falta de evidencia vinculada con las bases neurológicas y genéticas de las intuiciones morales evolutivas que dicha teoría propone. A pesar de que la teoría de Haidt aparece hoy en día como el marco teórico probablemente más prometedor al momento de integrar los resultados provenientes de las distintas líneas de investigación interdisciplinaria abocadas al estudio de los fundamentos evolutivos de la psicología moral, argumentaré que i) también evidencia una subespecificación crítica en cuanto a los procesos mentales específicos que operan en la activación de nuestras intuiciones moral evolutivas, y que ii) dicha subespecificación coexiste con una sobreespecificación de la estructura de la naturaleza humana al momento de explorar alternativas a las sociedades capitalistas.

Descargas

Los datos de descargas todavía no están disponibles.

Citas

Cinatti, C. (2005). La actualidad del análisis de Trotsky frente a las nuevas (y viejas) controversias sobre la transición al socialismo. Estrategia Internacional, 22. https://www.ft-ci.org/La-actualidad-del-analisis-de-Trotsky-frente-a-las-nuevas-y-viejas-controversias-sobre-la?lang=es

Fox, P. T., Friston, K. J. (2012). Distributed processing; distributed functions? NeuroImage, 61(2), 407-426. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.12.051

Glascher, J., Rudrauf, D., Colom, R., Paul, L. K., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Adolphs, R. (2010). Distributed neural system for general intelligence revealed by lesion mapping. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(10), 4705-4709. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0910397107

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral Foundations Theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 55-130. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 1029-1046. https://doi.org/10/fhfs36

Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366-385. https://doi.org/10/cq64hc

Gray, K., Young, L., Waytz, A. (2012). Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality. Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 101-124. https://doi.org/10/bqc4

Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814-834. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.108.4.814

Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. London: Vintage Books.

Haidt, J., Graham, J. (2007). When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize. Social Justice Research, 20(1), 98-116. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z

Haidt, J., Hersh, M. A. (2001). Sexual morality: The cultures and emotions of conservatives and liberals 1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31(1), 191-221.

Haidt, J., Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues. Daedalus, 133(4), 55-66. https://doi.org/10.1162/0011526042365555

Haidt, J., Joseph, C. (2007). The moral mind. How five sets of innate intuitions guide the development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. En P. Carruthers (Ed.), The Innate Mind. Vol. 3: Foundations and the future, pp. 367-392. New York: Oxford University Press.

Harris, S. (2011). Moral landscape: How science can determine human values. New York: Free Press.

Kaskan, P. M., Franco, E. C. S., Yamada, E. S., de Lima Silveira, L. C., Darlington, R. B., & Finlay, B. L. (2005). Peripheral variability and central constancy in mammalian visual system evolution. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 272(1558), 91-100. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2004.2925

Kelly, D.R. (2011). Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Koleva, S., Haidt, J. (2012). Let’s Use Einstein’s Safety Razor, Not Occam’s Swiss Army Knife or Occam’s Chainsaw. Psychological Inquiry, 23(2), 175-178. https://doi.org/10/ggdmm7

Lindquist, K. A., Barrett, L. F. (2012). A functional architecture of the human brain: Emerging insights from the science of emotion. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(11), 533-540. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.005

Oosterwijk, S., Lindquist, K., Anderson, E., Dautoff, R., Moriguchi, Y., Barrett, L. (2012). States of mind: Emotions, body feelings, and thoughts share distributed neural networks. NeuroImage, 62, 2110-2128. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.05.079

Palecek, M. (2017). Modularity of Mind: Is It Time to Abandon This Ship? Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 47(2), 132-144. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116672833

Prinz, J. J. (2006). Is the mind really modular? En R. Stainton (Ed.), Contemporary debates in cognitive science, pp. 22-36. Oxford: Blackwell.

Rozin, P., Haidt, J. (2013). The domains of disgust and their origins: Contrasting biological and cultural evolutionary accounts. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(8), 367-368. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.001

Rozin, P., Haidt, J., McCauley, C. R. (2008). Disgust. En M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of Emotions, pp. 757-776. New York: Guilford Press.

Schein, C., Gray, K. (2018). The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 22(1), 32-70. https://doi.org/10/gcvxrf

Suhler, C. L., Churchland, P. (2011). Can Innate, modular «foundations» explain morality? Challenges for Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(9), 2103-2116; discussion 2117-2122. https://doi.org/10/fsr92d

Thagard, P., Schröder, T. (2015). Emotions as Semantic Pointers: Constructive Neural Mechanisms. En L. F. Barrett & J. A. Russell (Eds.), The psychological construction of emotion, pp. 144-167. London: The Guilford Press.

Trotsky, L. (2006). La revolución permanente. Buenos Aires: Utopía Libertaria.

Wilson, E. O. (1978). On Human Nature. New York: Penguin.