A Conceptualist Reading of the Continuity Argument

Nicolás Alejandro Serrano

doi:10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp223-242

Autores/as

Nicolás Alejandro Serrano Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp223-242

Palabras clave:

contenido conceptual, contenido no-conceptual, percepción, cognición animal, neurociencia cognitiva

Resumen

En este trabajo reconstruyo el argumento no-conceptualista de continuidad para mostrar que implica una concepción implausible de la experiencia en animales supuestamente carentes de conceptos. Para ello, analizo las limitaciones de las formulaciones tradicionales del argumento, sus premisas implícitas, y las premisas adicionales necesarias para usarlo como objeción al conceptualismo. Luego, apelo a consideraciones filosóficas y estudios en neurociencia cognitiva, etología, psicología comparada y psicología del desarrollo, para mostrar que, incluso si el argumento sirviese como crítica al conceptualismo, implicaría una concepción de la experiencia animal contraría a nuestras teorías científicas e, incluso, a los intereses del no-conceptualismo. Concluyo que, si deseamos defender la continuidad entre la experiencia de perceptiva de humanos adultos y otros animales, debemos hacerlo atribuyendo conceptos a los últimos.

Citas

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