Restando sufrimiento: un enfoque anti-agregacionista del sufrimiento en la naturaleza

Alejandro Villamor

doi:10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp243-267

Autores/as

Alejandro Villamor IES de Sar (Santiago de Compostela, España)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp243-267

Palabras clave:

Aggregationism, Anti-Aggregationism, Animal Ethics, Animal Suffering, Interventionism

Resumen

En los últimos años, cada vez es mayor el número de personas que creen en una prevalencia del sufrimiento sobre el bienestar en la naturaleza. Esta creencia suele coincidir con una axiología sensocentrista según la cual lo moralmente relevante son los estados mentales de placer y dolor. Esta combinación conduce al diagnóstico de que la prevalencia del sufrimiento tiene una enorme relevancia moral. Este artículo rechaza esta línea de pensamiento tradicional y argumenta, en su lugar, que podría no ser coherente. La afirmación de que existe una prevalencia ontológica, en abstracto, del sufrimiento en la naturaleza no es problemática. Sin embargo, no sucede lo mismo al respecto de su relevancia moral. Un sensocentrista no puede considerar que un cálculo agregacionista sea moralmente valioso, estrictamente hablando, pues no hay sujeto que lo sienta. No obstante, podría mantenerse la necesidad de una intervención positiva en la naturaleza con el objetivo de reducir el sufrimiento existente.

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