Reevaluando el razonamiento inductivo: un enfoque contemporáneo basado en la inducción de William Whewell
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https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss27pp97-118Palabras clave:
inducción, razonamiento inductivo, práctica científica, modelos, inducción de WhewellResumen
Tradicionalmente, los intentos de comprender el razonamiento inductivo en la ciencia se han centrado en un análisis con base en enunciados o proposiciones. Sin embargo, argumentos recientes sugieren que este enfoque constituye un error y plantean la necesidad de una nueva perspectiva. Este estudio ofrece una nueva visión de la inducción a partir de la teoría de la inducción de William Whewell con base en dos formas de razonamiento: la interpretación y la representación. Esta perspectiva sugiere que la inducción puede verse como un proceso de razonamiento que utiliza modelos semánticos y pragmáticos modernos, en lugar de enunciados o proposiciones.
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