The shifting explananda of philosophical theories of remembering

André Sant'Anna; James Openshaw

doi:10.22370/rhv2025iss28.4849

Autores/as

André Sant'Anna University of Geneva https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2239-7243
James Openshaw Nanyang Technological University https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9479-6067

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2025iss28.4849

Palabras clave:

filosofía de la memoria, teorías del recuerdo, memoria, explicación, metafilosofía

Resumen

La filosofía de la memoria ha crecido rápida y significativamente en la última década. En este comentario, nos basamos en observaciones críticas que hemos articulado individualmente en trabajos previos para sugerir que la investigación futura en el área se beneficiaría de (i) hacer más explícitas las diferencias entre los proyectos teóricos, revelando diversas suposiciones y compromisos metodológicos, y de (ii) identificar dónde los desacuerdos a este nivel han sido erróneamente tomados como disputas unívocas y de primer orden sobre “la naturaleza del recuerdo”. Ampliar la perspectiva en esta etapa de la filosofía de la memoria nos dará una idea más clara de dónde estamos, cuánto hemos avanzado y hacia dónde deberíamos dirigirnos.

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