Imagining How
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2026iss30.4754Keywords:
imagination, know-how, imagining-how, learning-howAbstract
En este ensayo, examino el problema de cómo podríamos proveer una teoría de lo que voy a llamar imaginar-cómo, es decir, imaginar cómo puede hacerse algo. Después de examinar la viabilidad de enfoques proposicionales, interrogativos y objetuales, argumento que un enfoque objetual, en el que el imaginar-cómo es una actitud dirigida directamente a una manera de actuar bajo la apariencia de ser relevante a una pregunta sobre cómo hacer algo, es preferible. Propongo que la imaginación bajo restricciones es informativa, y que puede jugar un rol en el aprendizaje de cómo actuar.
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