Imaginar Cómo
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2026iss30.4754Palabras clave:
imaginación, imaginar-cómo, saber-cómo, aprender-cómoResumen
In this paper, I examine the issue of how to provide an account of what I will call imagining-how, imagining how something can be done. After surveying the prospects of propositional, interrogative and what I will call objectual approaches, I argue that an objectual approach where imagining-how is taken to be an attitude directed towards a way directly (under the guise of being relevant to a question about how to do something) is to be preferred. I argue that imagining under constraints can be informative, and that it can play a role in learning how to act.
Descargas
Referencias
Archer, A. (2018). Wondering about what you know. Analysis, 78(4), 596–604.
Badura, C. (2020). More aboutness in imagination. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 50, 523–547.
Bengson & Moffett (2011). Nonpropositional intellectualism. In J. Bengson & M. A. Moffett (eds.) Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action, 161–195. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berninger, Anja & Vendrell Ferran, Íngrid (eds.) (2022). Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination. New York, NY: Routledge.
Berto, F. (2017). Impossible worlds and the logic of imagination. Erkenntnis, 82, 1277–1297.
Berto, F. (2018). Aboutness in imagination. Philosophical Studies, 175, 1871–1886.
Carruthers, P. (2018). Basic Questions. Mind and Language, 33(2), 130-147.
Carter, J.A. & Poston, T. (2018). A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How. London: Bloomsbury.
Cath, Y. (2011). Knowing-how without knowing-that. In J. Bengson & M. A. Moffett (eds.) Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action, 113–135. Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press.
Ciardelli, I., Groenendijk, J. & Roelefsen, F. (2019). Inquisitive Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Costa-Leite, A. (2010). Logical properties of imagination. Abstracta, 6(1), 103–116.
Drucker, D. (2020). The Attitudes We Can Have. Philosophical Review, 129(4), 591–642.
Fantl, J. (2008). Knowing-how and knowing-that. Philosophy Compass, 3(3), 451–470.
Farkas, K. (2018). Know-how and non-propositional intentionality. In A. Grzankowski & M. Montague (eds.) Non-Propositional Intentionality, 95–13. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Friedman, J. (2013). Question-Directed Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives, 27(1), 145–174.
Friedman, J. (2017). Why suspend judging? Nous, 51(2), 302–326.
Gendler. T. S. (2003). On the relation between pretense and belief. In M. Kieran (ed.) Imagi-nation, Philosophy and the Arts, 124–141. London: Routledge.
Goldwasser, S. (2024). Imagining as a skillful mental action. Synthese 204(38). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04681-1
Hamblin, C.L. 1958. Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 36(3), 159–168.
Hawley, K. (2010). Testimony and knowing how. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41, 397-404.
Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. Cornell University Press.
Karttunen, L. (1977). Syntax and Semantics of Questions. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1, 3–44.
Kind, A. (2001). Putting the image back in imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-search, 62(1), 85–109.Kind, A. (2023). Memory, imagination, and skill. In A. Berninger & I. Vendrell Ferran (eds.). Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagina-tion, 193-211. New York: Routledge.
Kind, A. (2020). The skill of imagination. In E. Fridland, & C. Pavese (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise, 335-346. New York, NY: Routledge.
Kind, A. & Kung, P. (eds) (2016). Knowledge through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kung, P. (2010). Imagining as a guide to possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(3), 620–663.
Lewis, D. K. (1988). Relevant implication. Theoria 54, 161–174.
Masny, M. (2020). Friedman on suspended judgment. Synthese, 197, 5009–5026.
Morales Carbonell, F. (2023). Compressing graphs: A model for the content of understand-ing. Erkenntnis 90, 187-215. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-023-00694-3.
Morales Carbonell, F. (manuscript). Individual and collective know-how are understanding-like.
Myers, J. (2024). Imagination as a source of empirical justification. Philosophy Compass, e12969. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12969.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.
Niiniluoto, I. (1985). Imagination and fiction. Journal of Semantics, 4(3), 209–222.
Pavese, C. (2021). Knowledge-how. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/knowledge-how
Poston, T. (2016). Know How to Transmit Knowledge? Noûs 50(4), 865-878.
Rothstein, S. (2004). Structuring Events: A Study in the Semantics of Aspect. London: Blackwell.
Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.
Sher, G. (2013). Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Snowdon (2011). Rylean arguments: ancient and modern. In In J. Bengson & M. A. Moffett (eds.) Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action, 59–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J. (2011). Know How. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J. & Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing how. The Journal of Philosophy. 65(6), 157–170.
Walton, K. L. (1990). Mimesis and Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wansing, H. (2015). Remarks on the logic of imagination: a step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination. Synthese, 194, 2843–2861.
Whitcomb, D. (2010). Curiosity was framed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81, 664–687.
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. London: Blackwell.
Williamson, T. (2016). Knowing by imagining. In Knowledge Through Imagination (A. Kind & P. Kung, eds.), 113–123, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yablo, S. (1993). Is conceivability a guide to possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-search, 53, 1–42.
Yablo, S. (2013). Aboutness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Descargas
Publicado
Número
Sección
Licencia
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.
Aquellos autores/as que tengan publicaciones con esta revista, aceptan los términos siguientes:
- Los autores/as conservarán sus derechos de autor y garantizarán a la revista el derecho de primera publicación de su obra, el cual estará simultáneamente sujeto a la Licencia de reconocimiento de Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International) que permite a terceros compartir la obra siempre que se indique su autor y su primera publicación esta revista.
- Los autores/as podrán adoptar otros acuerdos de licencia no exclusiva de distribución de la versión de la obra publicada (p. ej.: depositarla en un archivo telemático institucional o publicarla en un volumen monográfico) siempre que se indique la publicación inicial en esta revista.
- Se permite y recomienda a los autores/as difundir su obra a través de Internet (p. ej.: en archivos telemáticos institucionales o en su página web) antes y durante el proceso de envío, lo cual puede producir intercambios interesantes y aumentar las citas de la obra publicada. (Véase El efecto del acceso abierto).
