Composición, identidad y cardinalidad

Sebastián Briceño

doi:10.22370/rhv2020iss16pp17-40

Autores/as

Sebastián Briceño Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Chile

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2020iss16pp17-40

Palabras clave:

todo, partes, unidad, plurales, indiscernibilidad de los idénticos, inocencia ontológica, compromiso ontológico

Resumen

En este artículo intento dar cuenta de la tesis según la cual composición es identidad y de las críticas que pueden formularse en contra de la misma. Según la versión débil de la tesis, composición, por el hecho de ser análoga a identidad en ciertos respectos importantes, es tan ontológicamente inocente como identidad. Según la versión fuerte de la tesis, composición es literalmente una especie de la relación genérica de identidad, y es tan ontológicamente inocente como toda especie de identidad. Como veremos, la versión débil incurre en una petición de principio o en un non sequitur; y la version fuerte es incoherente y enfrenta un dilema. Así, composición no es identidad: una cosa no puede ser idéntica a varias cosas.

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