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La fundamentación no es una medida adecuada de la complejidad física

Autores/as

  • Carlos Romero Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss25pp91-111

Palabras clave:

dependencia, complejidad, fundamentación, emergencia

Resumen

Después de introducir el artículo (§1), repasaré los aspectos más generales y centrales de la literatura sobre la fundamentación (§2); esta tarea me parece valiosa ya que no existen revisiones generales y actualizadas en español sobre el tema. Después, argumentaré que la fundamentación no es una medida de complejidad física, y que, sin un vínculo necesario con la complejidad, quedan pocas razones para pensar que la fundamentación une a los diferentes estratos de la realidad física, que es una de las motivaciones más importantes para introducir relaciones de dependencia (§3).

Citas

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Publicado

2024-07-25

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Romero, C. (2024). La fundamentación no es una medida adecuada de la complejidad física. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (25), 91–111. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss25pp91-111

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Sección Monográfica