Grounding is not an adequate measure of physical complexity

Authors

  • Carlos Romero Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss25pp91-111

Keywords:

dependence, complexity, grounding, emergence

Abstract

After introducing the paper (§1), I will review the most general and central aspects of the literature on grounding (§2); I believe this task to be valuable since there are no general and updated reviews in Spanish on the subject. I will then argue that grounding is not a measure of physical complexity, and that, without a necessary link to complexity, there is little reason to think that grounding unites the different strata of physical reality, which is one of the most important motivations to introduce dependence relationships (§3).

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Published

2024-07-25 — Updated on 2024-07-28

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How to Cite

Romero, C. (2024). Grounding is not an adequate measure of physical complexity. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (25), 91–111. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss25pp91-111 (Original work published July 25, 2024)

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