Motor Cognition in Design Sciences

Authors

  • Anna Estany Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss20pp13-28

Keywords:

motor cognition, design sciences, praexology, design thinking, interactive vision

Abstract

Starting from the naturalistic program and within the framework of cognitive sciences, issues such as the representation of knowledge, the role of technology, the relationship between theory and experiment and the theoretical burden of observation have been addressed. In any of these analyses, the idea is to contrast the philosophical proposal with some of the theories and results of the cognitive sciences, with the purpose of seeing to what extent they reinforce each other, one reinforces the other but not the other way around, or they are irrelevant. The objective of this work is to place design at the center of philosophical analysis from the perspective of cognitive science. However, the cognitive approach has been applied much less to the analysis of design sciences, despite the fact that its possibilities are not less when it comes to addressing the challenges involved in the application of scientific knowledge to the transformation of the world. The starting hypothesis is that there are implications between design sciences and motor cognition; therefore, they are not irrelevant. The degree of connection and neurocognitive foundation of the design sciences will be elucidated as the analysis progresses in order to draw conclusions, both for the design processes and for the cognitive approach in general.

References

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Published

2022-12-01 — Updated on 2022-12-02

How to Cite

Estany, A. (2022). Motor Cognition in Design Sciences. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (20), 13–28. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2022iss20pp13-28

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