The shifting explananda of philosophical theories of remembering
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2025iss28.4849Keywords:
Theories of remembering, memory, philosophy of memory, explanation, metaphilosophyAbstract
The philosophy of memory has grown significantly and very rapidly in the past decade. In this commentary, we draw on critical remarks that we have individually articulated in previous work to suggest that future research in the area would benefit from (i) making differences of theoretical projects more explicit, revealing diverse assumptions and methodological commitments, and (ii) identifying where disagreements at this level have been mistaken for univocal, first-order disputes about ‘the nature of remembering’. Zooming out at this stage of the philosophy of memory will give us a clearer idea of where we are, how far we have come, and where we ought to go from here.
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