Enfoque dialógico de la noción de hipótesis como relación entre dos pruebas

Juan Redmond; Rodrigo Lopez-Orellana

doi:10.22370/rhv2024iss27pp83-95

Authors

Juan Redmond Universidad de Valparaíso
Rodrigo Lopez-Orellana Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de Valparaíso, Chile / Instituto de Estudios de la Ciencia y la Tecnología (ECYT), Universidad de Salamanca, España

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss27pp83-95

Keywords:

hypothesis, logic, conditionals, demonstration, interaction

Abstract

In this article we defend the idea that hypotheses in science must be understood as a demonstration where a relation between two proofs is established in a dynamic and interactive way. To this end, we appeal to the notion of demonstration by hypothesis that Aristotle outlines in his Prior Analytics. In this way, we circumscribe the generation of hypotheses to the realm of dialectical interactions in which human beings and their actions as argumentative agents with purposes and aims play a central role. This demonstration takes the form of a conditional and is constructed by agreement between epistemic agents. We choose the perspective of dialogical pragmatism to formally capture this relationship.

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