A Hundred Years of Metaphysics within the Analytic Tradition. Introduction to the Monographic Section on Contemporary Analityc Metaphysics

Carlo Rossi

Abstract


Introduction to the monographic section on contemporary analytic metaphysics


Keywords


metaphysics; analityc philosophy; analityc metaphysics

References


Adams, R.M. (1974). Theories of Actuality. Noûs, 8, 211–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214751

Adams, R.M. (1979). Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Journal of Philosophy, 76, 5-26. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025812

Armstrong, D.M. (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139172226

Armstrong, D.M. (1978). A Theory of Universals (Vol. 2 of Universals and Scientific Realism). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Audi, P. (2012). A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding. En F. Correia y B. Schneider (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, pp. 101-121. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139149136.004

Ayer, A.J. (1936). Language, Truth, and Logic. Londres: Gollancz.

Barcan, R. (1946). A Functional Calculus of First Order Based on Strict Implication. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 11, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.2307/2269159.

Baxter, D. L. M. (1988). Many-one Idetity. Philosophical Papers, 17, 193-216. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568648809506300

Baxter, D. L. M. (2014). Identity, Discernibility, and Composition. En A. J. Cotnoir y D. L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, pp. 244-253. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669615.001.0001

Bennett, K. (2004). Spatio-temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem. Philosophical Studies, 118, 339-71. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000026471.20355.54

Black, M. (1952). The identity of indiscernibles. Mind, 61, 153-164. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXI.242.153

Bliss, R. y Trogdon, K. (2014). Metaphysical Grounding. Stanford Encyclopaedia for Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grounding/. Acceso: 05/09/2020.

Bohn, E. (2014). Unrestricted composition as identity. En A. J. Cotnoir y D. L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, pp. 143-165. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669615.001.0001

Brewer, B. y Cumpa, J. (2019). The Nature of Ordinary Objects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316612897

Bricker, P. (2016). Composition as a Kind of Identity. Inquiry, 59, 264-294. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1040447

Campdelacreu, M. (2016). Sutton’s Solution to the Grounding Problem and Intrinsically Composed Colocated Objects. Crítica, 48, 77-92. https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2016.223

Carnap, R. (1928). Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag.

Chalmers, D., Manley, D. Wasserman, D. (eds.) (2009). Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chisholm, Roderick. (1976). Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.

Correia, F. y Schnieder, B. (eds.) (2012). Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139149136

Correia, F. (2010). Grounding and Truth-Functions. Logique Et Analyse, 53(211), 251-279. https://doi.org/10.2307/44084957

Cotnoir, A. and Baxter, D. (eds.) (2014). Composition as Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669615.001.0001

Fine, K. (2003). The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter. Mind, 112, 195-234. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/112.446.195

Fine, K. (2008). I—Kit Fine: Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 82, 101-118. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00164.x

Fine, K. (2012). A Guide to Ground. En F. Correia y B. Schneider (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, 37-80. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139149136.002

Frege, G. (1891). Funktion und Begriff. Vortrag, gehalten in der Sitzung vom 9. Januar 1891 der Jenaischen Gesellschaft für Medizin und Naturwissenschaft. Jena: Hermann Pohle.

Frege, G. (1892). Über Begriff und Gegenstand. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 16, 192–205.

Garcia, R. (2014). Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology. Acta Analytica, 29(2), 149-159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0208-2

Garcia, R. (2014a). Bundle Theory’s Black Box: Gap Challenges for the Bundle Theory of Substance. Philosophia, 42 (1), 115-26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9466-x

Gilmore, C. (2018). Location and Mereology. Stanford Encyclopaedia for Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/location-mereology/. Acceso: 05/09/20.

Kleinschmidt, S. (ed.) (2014). Mereology and Location. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593828.001.0001

Korman, D. (2015). Objects. Nothing out of the Ordinary, Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732532.001.0001

Kripke, S. (1959). A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.2307/2964568

Kripke, S. (1963). Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16, 83–94.

Kripke, S. (1971). Identity and Necessity. En M.K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation, pp. 135–64. New York: New York University Press.

Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.

Plantinga, A. (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0198244142.001.0001

Quine, W.V.O. (1953). On What There Is. En From a Logical Point of View, pp. 1-19. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

Quine, W.V.O. (1953a). Reference and Modality. En From a Logical Point of View, pp. 139–159. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

Ramsey, F. (1925). Universals. Mind, 34, 401–17. https://doi.org/10.2307/2249716

Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate.

Russell, B. (1912a). On the Relations of Universals and Particulars. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 12, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.2307/4543817

Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. En B. Hale y A. Hoffmann (Eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, pp. 109-36. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007

Schaffer, J. (2009). On What Grounds What. En D. Chalmers, D. Manley y R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, pp. 347-383. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Saenz, N. B. (2015). A Grounding Solution to the Grounding Problem. Philosophical Studies, 172, 2193 – 2214. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0405-x

Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/019924443X.001.0001

Sutton, C.S. (2012). Colocated Objects, Tally-Ho: A Solution to the Grounding Problem. Mind, 121, 703-30. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs078

van Inwagen, P. (1981). The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62, 123-137. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1981.tb00051.x

van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713033

Varzi, A. (2020). Mereology. Stanford Encyclopaedia for Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/. Acceso: 19/03/20.

Williams, D. C. (1953). On the Elements of Being: I. The Review of Metaphysics, 7 (1), 3-18. https://doi.org/10.2307/20123348.

Wallace, M. (2014). Composition as Identity, Modal Parts, and Mereological Essentialism. En A. Cotnoir y D. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity, pp. 111-129. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669615.001.0001

Wallace, M. (2011). “Composition as Identity: I-II”. Philosophy Compass, 6, 804-816, 817-827. https://doi.org/doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00431.x




DOI: https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2020iss16pp7-16

Copyright (c) 2021 Humanities Journal of Valparaíso

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.