Irrelevant Influences, Disagreements, and Debunking Reasoning: An Analysis Based on Self-Deception

Authors

  • Agostina Vorano Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico / Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas / Universidad de Buenos Aires / Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss22pp131-148

Keywords:

acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement, directional irrelevant influence, contingency anxiety, motivated irrationality, biases

Abstract

In this paper, we will object to the hypothesis according to which the epistemic challenge posed by irrelevant influences can be reduced to the one posed by acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement. We will develop our objection considering as a paradigmatic example of an irrelevant influence the desire that acts as a motivational factor in typical cases of self-deception. Furthermore, we will examine the role played by the debunking reasoning in the cases of disagreement in which one of the conflicting persons is self-deceived.

References

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Published

2023-10-31 — Updated on 2023-10-31

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How to Cite

Vorano, A. (2023). Irrelevant Influences, Disagreements, and Debunking Reasoning: An Analysis Based on Self-Deception. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (22), 131–148. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss22pp131-148

Issue

No. 22 (2023)

Section

Articles

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