The distinction between epistemology and ontology in reductionist explanations. The case of learning in a sea snail

Authors

  • Aldo Filomeno PUCV

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss25pp113-128

Keywords:

reductionism, epistemology, reductionist explanation

Abstract

This article briefly reviews some classical arguments in the debate on reductionism, both in support and against, emphasising the importance of not conflating epistemological limitations with ontological issues—a distinction that, in some cases, appears to be overlooked. To achieve this, we focus on another classic text in the reductionism debate, in addition to Anderson’s contribution in this monograph: ‘A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience’ by Gold and Stoljar (1999). Drawing upon analogies intended to enhance comprehension of the debate, we question the philosophical relevance of the impossibility of a reductionist explanation for the ontological dependency relationship.

References

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Published

2024-07-25

How to Cite

Filomeno, A. (2024). The distinction between epistemology and ontology in reductionist explanations. The case of learning in a sea snail. Revista De Humanidades De Valparaíso, (25), 113–128. https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss25pp113-128

Issue

No. 25 (2024)

Section

Monographic Section

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