Repensar la memoria y la imaginación
Una perspectiva filosófica y neurocientífica
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2025iss28.4790Palabras clave:
memoria, imaginación, neurociencia, reconsolidación, teoría de las marcas neuronales múltiples, simulacionismo, teoría causal de la memoriaResumen
¿Podemos distinguir la memoria de la imaginación? La visión constructiva contemporánea de la memoria, que sustituyó a la visión archivística, ha sido la perspectiva dominante durante los últimos treinta años. Sin embargo, aunque está ampliamente aceptado que la memoria episódica es constructiva, no hay consenso sobre hasta qué punto el recuerdo episódico es factivo o construido y cómo se alinea con la imaginación. El debate actual se centra en la (des)continuidad entre el recuerdo episódico y la imaginación, en concreto, si el recuerdo episódico debe conservar alguna conexión causal con episodios pasados a través de un rastro de memoria (engrama) o si puede ser totalmente construido. Este debate continúa los antiguos desafíos filosóficos de distinguir la memoria de la imaginación.
El artículo conecta las discusiones filosóficas históricas sobre las distinciones entre memoria e imaginación con el debate actual sobre si son del mismo tipo. Comienza examinando los criterios que los filósofos han utilizado para diferenciar la memoria de la imaginación, rastreando la discusión desde Hume hasta los debates contemporáneos. La segunda parte explora cómo la psicología cognitiva y la neurobiología han iniciado una nueva discusión sobre la formación de la memoria, argumentando que la reciente investigación neurocientífica apoya la teoría constructiva de la memoria y se alinea con el enfoque del continuum, sugiriendo que la memoria y la imaginación son del mismo tipo.
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