Ends, Values, and Organisms
A Discussion of José T. Alvarado’s ‘Biological Organisms or Darwinian Individuals?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2025iss29.5025Keywords:
teleology, organism, individuals, ends, values, evolutionary adaptationAbstract
José T. Alvarado recently conducted a critical examination of the notion of the Darwinian individual and a vindication of the notion of the organism. I propose to discuss some aspects of this critical examination. I will refer to his argument about the reductionist and deterministic consequences of the idea of the Darwinian individual. There are reasons to maintain that these apprehensions are unjustified. I will also argue that it is not an indefectible result of Darwinian theory that teleology is merely an illusion, as evidenced by current philosophical discussions about the nature of biological function. Finally, I argue that Alvarado (2024) confuses the ontogenetic and evolutionary senses of the term ‘adaptation’. Clarifying this confusion is important for the question of whether or not teleological explanation is eliminated by Darwinian explanation.
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